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Introduction 
 
This Bureau of Insurance report is in response to 2016 PL Chapter 404, An Act to Amend the Maine 
Guaranteed Access Reinsurance Act.   Chapter 404, §5 requires the Superintendent of Insurance to:  
 
 Review and report on differences between the Maine Guaranteed Access Reinsurance 
Association (MGARA) and the federal transitional reinsurance program, established and 
operated pursuant to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, which was operating in 
Maine between January 1, 2014 and December 31, 2016;   
 
 To make a recommendation to the Joint Standing Committee on Insurance and Financial 
Services as to whether MGARA should resume operations or be dissolved; and  
 
 To make a recommendation as to whether any changes should be made to the statute with 
respect to MGARA’s continued operation or dissolution.  
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Background 
 
Title 24-A M.R.S. Chapter 54-A, the Maine Guaranteed Access Reinsurance Association (MGARA) Act, 
was enacted by Part B of 2011 PL c. 90 (LD 1333), An Act to Modify Rating Practices for Individual and 
Small Group Health Plans and to Encourage Value-based Purchasing of Health Care Services.   
 
Pursuant to that law, MGARA was established as a private, nonprofit association.  MGARA’s goal was to 
improve the affordability of coverage in Maine’s individual health insurance market through the 
provision of reinsurance with respect to coverage on high-risk exposures in that market.  
 
MGARA was funded by a combination of reinsurance premiums paid by health insurers ceding coverage 
to MGARA and an assessment of $4 per covered person per month ($48 per year) levied against 
coverage provided in the individual, small group and large group markets, as well as against third party 
administrators of self-funded health plans.  MGARA began active operations on July 1, 2012 and 
continued to provide reinsurance through December 31, 2013.  
 
The Affordable Care Act (ACA), which became federal law on March 23, 2010, directed each state to 
establish a three-year transitional reinsurance program to be effective for calendar years 2014 through 
2016.  This program was intended to alleviate stress on individual health insurance markets brought 
about by the significant changes of the ACA.  The federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS), however, adopted rules creating a single national reinsurance pool rather than self-sustaining 
programs in each state.  This federal reinsurance pool was funded by assessments on all insured health 
markets and many self-funded plans.  
 
Although there were significant operational differences between MGARA and the federal transitional 
reinsurance program as implemented by CMS, the basic purpose and funding of the two programs was 
similar.  On January 28, 2013 the Superintendent of Insurance requested that CMS authorize MGARA to 
serve as Maine’s transitional reinsurance program and grant Maine an exemption from any conflicting 
provisions of the federal regulation. On February 7, 2013 that request was denied.  
 
Given the similar functions and sources of funding, it was clear that two simultaneously operating 
reinsurance programs were inappropriate.  In light of these developments, the 126th Maine Legislature 
enacted 2013 PL Chapter 273, An Act Regarding the Maine Guaranteed Access Reinsurance Association, 
which suspended active reinsurance operations of MGARA for the three year period from 2014 to 2016, 
but kept MGARA in existence in order to allow future legislative sessions to reactivate it, based on future 
need.  Chapter 273 provided that, absent further legislative guidance, MGARA would recommence 
active operations with respect to coverage effective on or after January 1, 2017.  The Second Regular 
Session of the 127th Maine Legislature gave further consideration to MGARA.  2016 PL Chapter 404 
continued the suspension of MGARA’s reinsurance operations through December 31, 2017 and 
requested this Report.1 Absent further legislative action during 2017, the “default option” is that 
MGARA’s reinsurance operations will be reactivated as of January 1, 2018. 
                                                          
1
 One reason for the extension of MGARA’s suspension through 2017 despite the absence of federal reinsurance was the 
realization that the ACA’s premium tax credits for low income individuals were structured in a way that provides a disincentive 
for Maine to reactivate MGARA. To the extent that MGARA was successful in reducing premiums for individual policyholders 
receiving premium tax credits, the lower premiums would reduce the premium tax credits. Those savings, funded by 
assessments across Maine’s health insurance marketplace, would go to the U.S. Treasury.   
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Comparison of MGARA and Federal Transitional Reinsurance Under the ACA 
 
MGARA and the federal transitional reinsurance program operated under the Affordable Care Act 
shared the common goal of providing premium relief to the individual health insurance market.  
However, there are many program differences.  Key differences include the following: 
 
 State-based versus national reinsurance pool.  Under MGARA, assessments collected from 
Maine individual policyholders, Maine group policyholders and third party administrators of self-
funded employee benefit plans in Maine were used to benefit the Maine individual health 
insurance market.  In contrast, the federal transitional reinsurance program utilized a national 
reinsurance pool. Assessments collected from Mainers were pooled with those collected in 
other states for the payment of claims.   
 
 Prospective versus retrospective reinsurance pool.  MGARA operated as a prospective 
reinsurance pool. Specific individuals with a high risk of incurring large health claims were 
identified by the health carriers, some by standards developed by MGARA’s Board of Directors 
and others by carrier discretion.  MGARA reinsured their coverage on a calendar-year basis, and 
reinsurance was effective only if the carrier paid the applicable reinsurance premium when due 
and designated the individual for reinsurance in advance of the coverage year (except for new 
enrollees, who could be designated up to 60 days after their insurance policies took effect).  If 
those specific individuals then incurred claims in excess of the attachment point2 of the 
reinsurance coverage, the carrier would be eligible for reimbursement from MGARA.  Federal 
transitional reinsurance, by contrast, automatically provided relief to carriers with respect to 
any individuals covered in the individual market whose claims exceeded the federal attachment 
points.  
 
 Covered Services. The federal program provided reinsurance benefits only with respect to 
“essential health benefits,” as determined under the ACA, whereas MGARA did not restrict the 
types of claims that were eligible.  
 
 Assessment amounts.  MGARA’s annual assessments were $4 per covered person per month 
($48 per year).  The federal transitional reinsurance assessment was $63 per covered person per 
year in 2014, $44 per covered person per year in 2015, and $27 per covered person per year in 
2016. 
 
 Assessment base. While both MGARA and the federal transitional reinsurance program levied 
assessments on the individual, small group and large group health insurance markets, as well as 
on third-party administrators of self-funded plans, the federal program also levied assessments 
on self-administered, self-funded employee benefit plans.  Maine’s ability to include self-
administered, self-funded plans in the MGARA assessment base was and is preempted by 
federal law.3 
 
                                                          
2
  A reinsurance “attachment point” is the dollar amount above which the reinsurance is applicable.  Claims below 
the attachment point remain funded solely by the health carrier issuing the coverage.  
3
 29 U.S. Code § 1144(a) 
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 Use of assessments.  While all of MGARA’s assessments were utilized for MGARA operations, the 
ACA required portions of the federally-collected assessments to be paid by CMS to the U.S. 
Treasury.  These amounts were $2 billion in 2014, $2 billion in 2015 and $1 billion in 2016. 4 
 
 Reinsurance benefit structure.  MGARA provided for payment of 90% of claims between $7,500 
and $32,500 and 100% of claims over $32,500 for an eligible individual in a given year.  Benefits 
under the federal transitional reinsurance program varied by year.  They were as follows: 
 
o 2014:  80% of claims between $60,000 and $250,000.  (The $60,000 attachment point 
was subsequently lowered to $45,000 and the percentage paid by the program raised to 
100%, thereby resulting in additional payments to carriers.) 
 
o 2015:  50% of claims between $45,000 and $250,000 (that percentage was later raised 
to 55.1%) 
 
o 2016:  50% of claims between $90,000 and $250,000 
 
 Results.  
o MGARA collected approximately $26.3 million in premium from health carriers in the 
individual market during its 18 months of active operations in 2012 and 2013.  Total 
assessments, including a special organizational assessment, were approximately $41.2 
million.  It paid approximately $66 million in reinsurance claims to individual health 
insurance market carriers.  Based on rate filing information submitted by Anthem in 
Maine’s individual market, the program resulted in about a 20% reduction in requested 
rates. 
  
o The federal transitional reinsurance program paid approximately $41.9 million with 
respect to 2014 Maine claims and $48.9 with respect to 2015 Maine claims.5  The Maine 
Bureau of Insurance does not have the total amount of funds paid by Maine’s health 
insurance market into the federal transitional reinsurance program’s national pool.  The 
Bureau estimates payments for the fully insured market to have been approximately 
$20.25 million in 2014 and $18 million in 2015, but has no information regarding 
payments made with respect to self-funded plans. 
  
o Both MGARA and the federal transitional reinsurance program have helped stabilize 
Maine’s individual health insurance market.  Prior to MGARA, rates had increased on 
average from 10.9%-16.7% annually.  The effect of the absence of federal transitional 
reinsurance is well illustrated by 2017 rate filings of health carriers.  The premium 
impact of removing the federal reinsurance program ranged from 4.6% to 6.2% in the 
filings, depending on the carrier.    
  
                                                          
4
 It is the Bureau’s understanding that $4 billion of these payments are currently outstanding.  Should CMS be 
required to remit these funds to the Treasury, it is unclear whether reinsurance payments due to be paid to 
carriers for 2016 would be effected.  
5
 Federal transitional reinsurance claims payments with respect to 2016 are unavailable as of the time of this 
report.  
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Recommendations Regarding MGARA 
 
Maine’s current individual health insurance market is very different than it was in 2011 when the 125th 
Legislature considered LD 1333.  At that time, just two health insurers6 sold individual coverage in 
Maine.  The majority of purchasers could afford only high deductible plans.7  There were fewer than 
35,000 covered lives in the individual market, many of whom were in poor health.    
 
By contrast, in 2017 there are four carriers in this market.8  There were more than 87,000 insureds in 
this marketplace after open enrollment in 2016 and maximum annual out of pocket costs for 2017 are 
$7,150 per individual and $14,300 per family.  It is likely that many insureds purchased coverage due to 
the ACA mandate that persons without coverage pay a federal income tax penalty or because their 
coverage was made affordable by the presence of ACA provisions such as premium tax credits, cost-
sharing subsidies and transitional reinsurance.  What changes will be implemented at the federal level 
now, or how any changes will affect marketplace dynamics is unknown at this time.  
 
Since the enactment of PL c. 404 in March 2016, MGARA’s Board of Directors has been considering 
future options.  The result of these deliberations is summarized in a December 1, 2016 letter from 
Christopher Howard, Esq., Counsel for the Board, to the Superintendent of Insurance.9  Assuming the 
continuation of the existing ACA, the Board considered a proposal for the State to seek a waiver 
pursuant to Section 1332 of the ACA.  Section 1332 of the ACA allows states to apply for federal 
approval to deviate from specific provisions of the ACA, provided that the state can demonstrate that its 
program will “provide coverage to a comparable number of residents of the state as would be provided 
coverage absent the waiver, would provide coverage that is at least as comprehensive and affordable as 
would be provided absent the waiver, and would not increase the Federal deficit.”10  Conceptually, the 
Board envisioned a waiver whereby the federal government would have returned to the State the 
aggregate amount of premium tax credit savings, as a result of a revitalized MGARA reinsurance 
program.  The Board considered this plan to hold substantial promise.  Details of how this would work 
are set forth in Mr. Howard’s letter.  At the present time, however, it is unknown whether either federal 
premium tax credits or the Section 1332 waiver exemption process will continue to exist prospectively, 
as both the new administration and Congressional leadership have been advocating that the ACA either 
be repealed or substantially altered.   
 
Should the ACA be completely repealed without any further federal action, a failure to reactivate 
MGARA at the state level would return Maine’s individual health insurance market to the pre-2012 
situation of a non-subsidized, guaranteed issue environment in which there would be no individual 
mandate to purchase coverage.  The Bureau would anticipate that under this scenario the market would 
likely become unstable. If healthy people, who were no longer required to purchase coverage or pay a 
federal income tax penalty exited the market, the experience would deteriorate and rates would rise.  
This could lead to a new death spiral where an increasingly unhealthy and shrinking block of covered 
persons were priced out of a market with fewer carriers and coverage options. 
                                                          
6
 Anthem Health Plans of Maine and MEGA Life and Health Insurance Company 
7
 $15,000 per year deductible plans were common 
8
 Anthem Health Plans of Maine, Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, Inc. and Maine Community Health Options both on 
and off the federally-facilitated marketplace (exchange) and Aetna Health, Inc. off exchange only.   
9
 Attachment A to this report. 
10
 31 CFR Part 33, Guidance issued 12/16/2015 
5 
 
The prior success of MGARA and of the federal transitional reinsurance program in stabilizing the market 
strongly suggests that such a mechanism would benefit the market in the future.  Unless any 
forthcoming federal reforms contemplate either a reinsurance facility or a federal high-risk pool (or 
some similar program), a reactivation of MGARA would likely be of assistance to the market.  
 
The timing of any reactivation of MGARA is also a consideration.  CMS is requiring final 2018 rates be 
submitted by August 21, 2017.11  In light of this deadline, rates will need to be filed with the Bureau in 
early May 2017 in order to allow time for Bureau consideration of the filings and possible rate hearings. 
Significant lead time is necessary for carriers to consider the anticipated effect of any law changes and 
to incorporate those expectations in their filings.  Additionally, the ACA requires individual health 
insurance market rates in effect to be guaranteed for a twelve (12) month period (i.e. carriers cannot 
change their rates).  These time frames make it challenging for any legislative action regarding MGARA 
in 2017 to be reflected in rates before 2019.     
 
Continuing the current suspension of MGARA’s active operations while awaiting developments on the 
federal level is also an option for the Legislature.  Should the Legislature decide on this course of action, 
a further amendment to 24-A M.R.S. § 3953 will be necessary because the default option is that MGARA 
would be reactivated in 2018.  
 
Another possibility is that the Legislature could decide that the MGARA program should be terminated 
and the association dissolved.  If this were to occur, MGARA would file a Plan of Termination for 
approval by the Superintendent of Insurance.  After satisfaction of debts and liabilities, including 
contingent liabilities, remaining fund balances would be used and applied for the general purpose for 
which MGARA was created.  It is unclear what specific programs might qualify in this regard.  MGARA 
currently has a fund balance of approximately $5 million, nearly all of which would be available for this 
purpose.  Given the uncertainty surrounding the health insurance marketplace the Bureau does not 
recommend dissolution of MGARA.  
  
                                                          
11
 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2018; 
Amendments to Special Enrollment Periods and the Consumer Operated and Oriented Plan Program Final Rule 
published in the Federal Register on December 22, 2016 and the December 16, 2016 CMS 2018 Annual Letter to 
Issuers.   
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Recommendations as to Statutory Changes 
 
 As noted, MGARA is currently organized under Maine law12 to operate as a “prospective” 
reinsurance program whereby the covered layers of reinsurance, with respect to policies issued 
on individuals at high risk of large claims, are ceded to MGARA.13  MGARA’s Board of Directors 
has considered using a “retrospective” reinsurance model.  The Board’s view, as summarized in 
Mr. Howard’s December 1, 2016 letter (Attachment A), favors the retrospective reinsurance 
approach as being less complex to administer, more economically stable and likely more flexible 
in light of potential federal activity affecting the market.  If the Legislature opts for a 
retrospective reinsurance approach, amendment of 24-A M.R.S. §§ 3955, 3958, 3959 and 3961 
as well as MGARA’s Plan of Operation will be necessary.  
 
 Another option may be an expansion of MGARA to the small group insurance market.  Maine’s 
small group health insurance marketplace consists of those group insurance policies issued to 
employers with 50 or fewer employees.  There has been a steady decline in the size of the small 
group market from a high of 118,000 insured lives in 2003 (98,756 in 2010 when the ACA was 
enacted) to 70,555 in 2016.  Average rate increases had been 10-21% during the years prior to 
the ACA.  Rate increases for the years 2014 through 2017 have been between 2-10% on average.  
However, providing subsidized reinsurance to this additional market would require additional 
funding to avoid reducing the effectiveness of the program to the individual health insurance 
market.  
                                                          
12
 24-A M.R.S. § 3958(1). 
13
 Ceded coverage is “invisible” to the policyholder. Neither policy benefits nor premiums are affected by the 
cession of coverage and all benefits payable to the policyholder or health care providers are paid by the issuing 
carrier.  Policyholders have no contractual privity to MGARA, which simply reimburses the carrier for any claims 
above the attachment points.  
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Conclusion 
 
During its 18 months of active operation in 2012 and 2013, the Maine Guaranteed Access Reinsurance 
Association (MGARA) was effective in limiting the increase in the cost of health insurance in Maine’s 
individual health insurance market.  There is currently substantial uncertainty regarding the health 
insurance environment, largely due to uncertainty as to prospective federal reform efforts.  It is clear 
that if circumstances were to return to their pre-2010 status, in which Maine has guaranteed issue 
coverage, no requirement for individuals to purchase coverage, no premium or cost-sharing assistance 
to policyholders, and no state or federally-authorized program to provide reinsurance assistance to the 
market with respect to high risk individuals, a developing death spiral of the individual market could be 
reasonably anticipated.   
 
While MGARA has been previously shown to effectively stabilize rates in the individual market in prior 
circumstances, it may be less effective under scenarios that may develop in the future.   
 
Important issues for legislative consideration include the following: 
 
 Should MGARA be reactivated?   
 
 If so, should reactivation begin in 2018 or 2019? 
 
 Should MGARA’s reinsurance coverage operate on a prospective or retrospective basis? Should 
MGARA be expanded to provide reinsurance protection to the small group market?  If so, is the 
$4 per person per month assessment sufficient or would additional funding be required?  
  
8 
 
Appendix A 
 
Letter from Christopher E. Howard - Status Report Regarding Analysis of Possible Restart of Maine 
Guaranteed Access Reinsurance Association (“MGARA”) 
 
 {W5852405.4} 
CHRISTOPHER E. HOWARD 
Merrill’s Wharf  
254 Commercial Street 
Portland, ME 04101 
 
PH 207.791.1335  
FX 207.791.1350  
choward@pierceatwood.com 
pierceatwood.com 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        December 1, 2016 
 
Hon. Eric Cioppa 
Superintendent 
Maine Bureau of Insurance 
34 State House Station 
Augusta, ME 04333 
 
Re: Status Report Regarding Analysis of Possible Restart of Maine Guaranteed Access Reinsurance 
Association (“MGARA”) 
 
Dear Superintendent Cioppa: 
 
 This letter is a follow up to our recent phone conversation regarding the report the MGARA Board 
has been working on with respect to an analysis of alternatives for the future of a MGARA reinsurance 
program.  As we discussed, the recent events in Washington create significant uncertainty regarding the 
continuation of the ACA environment.  Although an outright repeal of the ACA seems unlikely, based on 
both President-elect Trump’s acknowledgement of the need for some sort of transition plan, and the early 
signals from Congress, it is simply unclear at this point precisely how the new administration and Congress 
will address the ACA, and the resulting implications for MGARA.     
 
 Although the MGARA Board is taking a wait and see position, the Board wanted to provide you 
with a summary of the work that has been done to date, so that you have the benefit of that analysis as you 
consider how to respond to developments on the national front and here in Maine.     
 
Background 
 In conjunction with the adoption of Public Law Chapter 404, March 23, 2016 (“PL 404”), 
MGARA committed to provide a report to you regarding possible alternatives for MGARA in an effort to 
help inform your report to the Insurance and Financial Services Committee (“IFS”) due by February 15, 
2017.  Section 5 of PL 404 adopted March 23, 2016 requires the following report from the Superintendent 
to IFS: 
 
Before February 15, 2017, the superintendent shall make a 
recommendation to the joint standing committee of the Legislature 
having jurisdiction over insurance and financial services matters as to 
whether the Maine Guaranteed Access Reinsurance Association 
should resume operations following its suspension pursuant to Title 
24-A, section 3953, subsection 1 pursuant to a revised plan of 
operation or should terminate its operations and dissolve and whether 
any changes should be made to the statutes governing the association 
in connection with its continued operation or dissolution. 
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In May 2011, the Legislature approved the establishment of MGARA as a private, nonprofit 
reinsurance program for the higher-risk segment of Maine’s individual health insurance market.  
Establishment of MGARA was intended to reduce costs in that market by providing reinsurance for a 
significant portion of the coverage provided through individual health insurance policies in Maine.  
MGARA funded this coverage through a combination of market-wide assessments and reinsurance 
premiums. 
 
Over MGARA’s period of active operation (Q3/4 of 2012 and 2013), MGARA paid approximately 
$66 million in claims and generated a positive fund balance of approximately $5 million.  Based on rate 
filings submitted by insurance carriers operating in Maine’s individual market, MGARA’s reinsurance 
program generated an approximate 20% reduction in requested rates.   
 
The federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (the “ACA”), which took effect on 
January 1, 2014, established a three-year federal transitional reinsurance program (the “Federal 
Reinsurance Program”), which, like MGARA, was funded through assessments on each state’s insurance 
market, including Maine’s.  In order to avoid imposing redundant costs on the Maine market through 
parallel federal and state individual market reinsurance programs, consistent with recommendations from 
MGARA and the Superintendent, the Legislature amended Title 24-A, M.R.S. chapter 54-A (“MGARA’s 
Enabling Legislation”) to suspend MGARA’s reinsurance program during the pendency of the Federal 
Reinsurance Program. That legislation called for reactivation of MGARA as of January 1, 2017.  PL 404 
extended this suspension through December 31, 2017. Absent changes to MGARA’s Enabling 
Legislation, MGARA is required to reactivate its operations effective January 1, 2018. 
  
The extension of MGARA’s suspension resulted from the realization that the  current  structure 
of the ACA’s subsidies for exchange participants in the form of premium tax credits (“PTC”) creates an 
economic disincentive for Maine to implement any MGARA-like reinsurance program.  To the extent a 
reactivated program has the effect of reducing premiums for many persons obtaining individual health 
insurance coverage on the federally-facilitated exchange in Maine (the “Exchange”), these lower 
premiums would in turn decrease the PTC amount to which Maine’s Exchange participants are entitled, 
and which the federal government must pay, under the ACA.  This result would represent a measurable 
cost-savings to the federal government, effectively funded by assessments on Maine’s insurance 
market. 
 
Existing ACA Section 1332 Waiver -- Potential Solution to Avoid Conflict With Federal Subsidy 
 
 Since the adoption of PL 404, a potential solution to the PTC conflict described above has been 
identified under the ACA as it exists today.  Current Section 1332 of the ACA permits a state to apply for 
approval to waive specific provisions of the ACA to permit the state to operate a health insurance program 
that deviates from those provisions, provided that the state can demonstrate that its program will “provide 
coverage to a comparable number of residents of the state as would be provided coverage absent the 
waiver, would provide coverage that is at least as comprehensive and affordable as would be provided 
absent the waiver, and would not increase the Federal deficit.”1  Maine should be able to demonstrate that 
MGARA’s program meets all of these criteria. 
 
The ACA currently provides that a state that applies for and receives a waiver pursuant to Section 
1332 (a “1332 Waiver”) is eligible to receive “the aggregate amount of such [premium tax] credits or [cost-
sharing] reductions that would have been paid on behalf of participants in the Exchanges … had the State 
not received such waiver, … for the purposes of implementing the State plan under the waiver.”2  
                                                 
1
 31 CFR Part 33, Guidance issued 12/16/2015.   
2
 42 U.S.C. 18052(a)(3). 
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Accordingly, if Maine were to apply for and obtain a 1332 Waiver, Maine would be eligible to receive 
pass-through funding
3
 equal to the federal government’s cost-savings resulting from MGARA’s positive 
effect on premium rates and corresponding reduction in the amount of PTC claimed by Maine’s Exchange 
participants. 
 
The federal Department of Health and Human Services (“USHHS”) has issued detailed 
requirements for a state application for a 1332 Waiver.  Set forth below are the principal tenets of a 
potential application for a 1332 Waiver to operate MGARA while avoiding the PTC conflict:  
 
1. Has the potential to allow for the operation of a MGARA-type program by confirming MGARA’s 
eligibility for federal pass-through funding in accordance with Section 1332 of the ACA.   
 
2. Federal pass-through funding would be deployed through MGARA to supplement market-wide 
assessment levels, thereby mitigating the cost of MGARA’s reinsurance program to Maine while 
preserving its positive effects on Maine’s individual insurance market; this has the potential to 
result in lower premiums being charged in the marketplace.   
 
3. The 1332 Waiver application is required to provide analysis and supporting data to inform its 
estimate of the pass-through funding amount, including economic analyses, assumptions, and 
methodologies consistent with the applicable federal regulations. 
 
4. Section 1332 requires that the 1332 Waiver application be accompanied by enacted state 
legislation authorizing the implementation of the 1332 Waiver.  Legislation amending MGARA’s 
Enabling Legislation could serve as the vehicle for this authorization. 
 
5. A public notice and comment period is required.   
 
It is important to understand the timing realities associated with this process.  The process for 
implementing this type of solution requires both legislation and application to CMS (and its “partner 
agencies,” most notably the U.S. Treasury).  We have discussed the possibility of a Section 1332 Waiver 
with CMS and the U.S. Treasury, and they are very supportive of that approach; however, even without 
any changes to the ACA, it would have been highly unlikely that both adoption of enabling legislation 
and approval of any 1332 application would have been concluded in time for carriers to include any cost 
savings associated with a new MGARA reinsurance program in their 2018 rate filings, which are due in 
May 2017.   
 
 In the current environment of uncertainty, the timing on implementing this approach is even less 
clear.  If there is rapid action at the federal level, and both subsidies and the Section 1332 waiver remain 
intact, then it may be possible to see legislation adopted here in Maine in the upcoming session, with a 
formal 1332 application to CMS filed immediately thereafter.  At best, the carriers would be in a position 
to include the impact of the reactivated program in their May 2018 rate filing for the 2019 year.  Notably, 
the State of Alaska is pressing ahead with their Section 1332 Waiver application, in the hope that it will 
remain relevant in light of whatever changes are made to the ACA. However, they already have 
Legislative authority for the Section 1332 application, and have appropriated the funds to run the 
program, so they are really just looking to recoup costs at this point.  It is not clear to me that faced with 
today’s environment the Alaska legislature/governor would choose to press ahead were the program not 
already authorized and funded. 
 
                                                 
3
 The applicable regulations use the term “pass-through funding” to refer to this return of savings to the state 
pursuant to Section 1332.   
 {W5852405.4} 
 Additionally, as discussed in greater detail below, whether, and to what extent, carriers will 
provide credit for the program is a very significant unanswered question. 
 
Dismantled ACA 
 
 It is possible that the ACA could be totally dismantled, or dramatically altered.  In that event, 
MGARA could be a highly relevant piece of the State’s approach to maintaining affordability and stability 
in its individual market.  MGARA originated in the pre-ACA environment.  A return or partial return to 
that landscape could see many of the same factors at work in Maine’s individual market.  MGARA was 
designed to function in that environment and was, for its brief period of active operation, an effective 
program in reducing rates in the individual market.  There can be little doubt that MGARA’s program will 
need to be adjusted in response to both the dramatic changes in Maine’s individual market and any changes 
in the ACA, but a MGARA-like reinsurance program would be highly relevant in that environment.   
  
Alternatives Analysis 
  
 In light of the background provided above, the following are the four basic options the Board has 
considered pursuant to the mandate in PL 404: 
 
1. Resume MGARA’s operations using a prospective reinsurance approach.  This model would 
replicate MGARA’s pre-suspension reinsurance program, funded by a $4.00 per covered person 
per month (“PMPM”) assessment plus reinsurance premiums for ceded lives, together with 
federal pass-through funding received through a 1332 Waiver, if approved.   
 
2. Resume MGARA’s operations using a retrospective reinsurance approach.  A retrospective 
approach would resemble the design of the Federal Reinsurance Program, with reinsurance 
attachment points, coinsurance amount and other thresholds to be determined based on economic 
and actuarial analysis.  This program would be funded by the same $4.00 PMPM assessment used 
in the prospective model, together with federal pass-through funding received through a 1332 
Waiver. 
 
3. Continue suspension of MGARA’s operations pending greater market stability. 
 
4. Terminate operations and dissolve MGARA.   
 
Following is an analysis of these four alternatives. 
 
Prospective Model 
 
 In a prospective model, carriers cede selected lives and receive a specified reinsurance benefit, 
funded in part by premiums paid on those ceded lives. Although the original MGARA prospective 
model was effective in rapidly reducing premium rates, the prospective model is unlikely to be as 
effective in the current ACA landscape, for several reasons.  The prospective model is significantly 
more complex to design and operate – both for MGARA and for carriers – than a retrospective model.  
Moreover, the prospective model carries heightened solvency risk relative to a retrospective program, a 
differential that is exacerbated in the current ACA context due to pricing volatility and the multiplier 
effect of a larger individual insurance market. Each of these factors is discussed in more detail in the 
following sections. 
 
1. Complexity relative to impact.  A prospective model is significantly more complex to design 
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and operate – both for MGARA and for carriers – than a retrospective model.  While the 
prospective model requires both advance selection of auto-ceded conditions and significant 
underwriting activity by carriers, the retrospective model requires neither.  MGARA’s prior 
prospective model made ceding selections a part of the carriers’ standard underwriting process, 
while underwriting was eliminated with the ACA. 
 
This differential in complexity in itself is evidently a persuasive factor for some carrier 
members as it would essentially require them to re-start the underwriting operations that have 
now been eliminated.  
 
Although there may be positive effects associated with the prospective model, those differences 
in result are difficult to quantify, and leave a key question for the Board – if we can achieve 
similar results with a less complex model, why pursue the more complex model? 
 
2. Insolvency risk.  MGARA’s existing prospective model is associated with greater solvency risk 
than a retrospective program, a differential that is exacerbated in the post-ACA context.  This 
differential derives from several sources: 
 
 Reinsurance cap: MGARA’s prospective program, as currently designed pursuant to 
statute, pays 90% of claims between $7,500 and $32,500 and 100% of claims above 
$32,500.  In contrast, in 2016 the retrospective Federal Program pays a portion of 
claims between $90,000 and $250,000 (and none above $250,000), and the applicable 
portion varies with the available reinsurance pool.  The Federal Program’s reinsurance 
cap and coinsurance adjustment mechanism both limit economic uncertainty within that 
model.   
 
It should be noted that a reinsurance cap and adjustable coinsurance levels could be 
included in a redesigned prospective program.  However, this would have the effect of 
injecting further complexity into the prospective model while reducing the potential 
benefits to the individual market. 
 
 More significant pricing challenges: The prospective model relies in large part on 
reinsurance premiums for lives ceded.  The difficulty of accurately pricing reinsurance 
premium in Maine’s larger and more volatile post-ACA individual market creates 
heightened insolvency risk relative to a retrospective model, which does not rely on 
premiums. 
 
 Multiplier effect: The number of lives in Maine’s individual market has nearly tripled 
since implementation of the ACA.  In this significantly larger market, the effect of 
deviations between actuarial assumptions underlying a prospective plan design (e.g., 
selection of auto-cede conditions) and actual experience is amplified, contributing to 
heightened exposure for MGARA.  
 
3. Potential for Changes in New Market Protections.  The ACA ushered in new market 
protections.  The future design of such protective mechanisms could affect the need for the 
breadth of coverage offered under MGARA’s existing program, and a more complicated 
prospective program has the potential to be less nimble in responding to future changes. For 
example, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”) recently proposed 
modification of the risk adjustment formula for 2018 in an effort to partially address the loss of 
reinsurance through the Federal Program. Although this is only a proposal, and applies only to 
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catastrophic losses, it demonstrates the possibility for future changes at the federal level that 
may indicate certain changes in the MGARA program.  Complex programs are more difficult to 
adjust than simpler programs. 
 
Retrospective Model 
 
In a retrospective model, reinsurance benefits are determined at the end of each year based on 
actual claims experience of all lives covered by the individual market.  This model could essentially 
mimic the Federal Reinsurance Program, with specific attachment points, coinsurance amount and other 
thresholds to be determined based on economic and actuarial analysis.  Reinsurance benefits that can be 
supported with the funding from the assessments plus Pass Through Payments can take a variety of forms, 
ranging from relatively low attachment points (e.g. $75,000) with relatively low coverage caps (e.g. 
$250,000), to more catastrophic reinsurance, such as an attachment point of $250,000 and a coverage cap 
of several million dollars. 
 
 As noted above, a 1332 Waiver could potentially facilitate reimplementation of MGARA’s 
program on an economically feasible basis.  At MGARA’s request, the Milliman, Inc. actuarial firm 
prepared a preliminary analysis estimating the revenues that would be returned to MGARA in the form of 
Section 1332 pass-through funding (“Pass Through Payments”).  These revenues are determined based 
upon the federal government’s cost-savings resulting from MGARA’s positive effect on premium rates 
and corresponding reduction in the amount that CMS would otherwise need to pay.   The results of this 
analysis are summarized below; however, it is important to understand that these results are based on a set 
of assumptions regarding the structure and operation of the ACA, the Section 1332 Waiver, the carriers’ 
response to the reactivation of the MGARA program and the Maine market that may not be reflective of 
actual experience as the program is implemented.  
 
1. The value of the $4 assessment base, net of expenses, is nearly $26 million annually.   
Assuming that individual marketplace carriers reduce their premiums by the full value of 
the assessments, less the $4 that they need to pay for their share of the assessment, 2018 
premiums could decrease by $22.32 PMPM, which is roughly 4.4% of the average 
estimated 2018 individual marketplace premium of $504 PMPM. 
 
2. If 100% of the amount of anticipated Pass Through Payments are also reflected in the 
2018 individual rates, premiums could be reduced by $45.55 PMPM, or about 9.0% of 
the average 2018 premium.  This is the combined effect of the $4 assessment plus the 
Pass Through Payments that represent 100% of the premium reduction on the 51% of the 
individual marketplace for which CMS has received the benefit of the premium 
reduction.  
 
3. There is likely to be some inefficiencies in the operations of MGARA and the Section 
1332 Waiver such that less than 100% of the maximum premium reductions will be 
realized.  By “inefficiencies”, we mean that carriers may not price to the maximum 
premium reduction, CMS may not pay 100% of the PTC savings back to MGARA, there 
may be additional operational costs that MGARA needs to absorb to cover the 
administration of the waiver program and there are many “unknowns” that could 
adversely impact the results of operation (i.e. economic efficiency) of this type of 
program. For example, there are questions concerning the extent to which CMS will be 
able to uphold any such commitment to Pass Through Payments on a timely basis, as well 
as the mechanism for making those payments. Although this could be clarified to some 
degree through the Section 1332 waiver application process, as of this date, these remain 
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significant open questions. 
 
4. Reinsurance arrangements (i.e. attachment point, coinsurance, maximum limit) can be 
structured in various ways, including relatively low attachment points and maximum 
limits such that the recoveries would cover a large number of claimants, to high 
attachment points and maximum limits that provide reinsurance protection against the 
relatively few, high amount claims that are likely to emerge in the individual 
marketplace.  
 
5. Introduction of a program similar to the federal transitional reinsurance will have less of 
an effect on the individual marketplace rates than the federal program.  This occurs 
because the portion of the total assessed lives in Maine that arise from the individual 
insurance marketplace is nearly twice that of the overall nationwide values.   For 
illustration, a $4.00 PMPM assessment across the entire Maine insurance marketplace 
generates a subsidy of about $26 PMPM for the individual marketplace; the same $4.00 
assessment nationwide would generate a subsidy of nearly $52 PMPM for the individual 
marketplace. 
 
Continued Suspension 
 
Given the current high levels of both market volatility and political and economic uncertainty, 
it may be advisable to continue MGARA’s current suspension for an additional year in anticipation that 
a reinstatement determination (and associated economic and actuarial projections) can be made in a 
more stable environment. 
 
 Continued suspension would require passage of legislation amending Section 3953, which, as 
noted above, currently contemplates resumption of operations on January 1, 2018.  During any period 
of suspension, MGARA would continue to incur and pay certain basic administrative costs associated 
with maintaining minimum administrative functions. 
 
Termination and Dissolution 
 
Permanent termination of MGARA’s program and dissolution of MGARA would require 
compliance with the Maine Non-Profit Corporation Act and MGARA’s Plan of Operation.  MGARA’s 
Plan of Operation currently provides that, upon termination, MGARA will file a Plan of Termination 
for approval by the Superintendent and any funds or assets held by MGARA will be applied and 
distributed in the following order of priority (i) payment of any remaining debts and/or liabilities, (ii) 
establishing reserves for any contingent liabilities, and (iii) transfer to a trust, non-profit corporation or 
other fund established pursuant to the termination plan to be used and applied for the general purposes 
for which MGARA was originally organized.  MGARA currently maintains approximately $5 million 
in fund balance, substantially all of which would be available for such transfer. 
 
Additional Considerations  
 
1. Under the existing ACA, in evaluating the benefits generated by reactivation of 
MGARA, it is important to understand that the direct beneficiaries of the program (whether prospective 
or retrospective) will be individuals with household income approaching 300% of the federal poverty 
level (“FPL”) because premiums for that group are not afforded the same buffering under the ACA’s 
PTC structure due to their income level.  The majority of Exchange participants (i.e., those between 
100% and 300% FPL) will, by and large, not be affected by increase or decrease in premium due to the 
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compensation provided through PTCs, which have the effect of capping Exchange participants’ 
financial exposure based on their household income. 
 
2. Although it is possible to reach the conclusion, based on the foregoing analysis, that a 
beneficial retrospective program could be successfully implemented assuming a 1332 Waiver and the 
additional revenues generated by Pass Through Payments, there is a significant margin of uncertainty 
inherent in the analysis.  Even with further analysis the benefits are not certain and there is no 
guarantee that the program will be successful, which may be the biggest risk in any decision to restart 
the program. 
 
3. A further question remains as to whether the MGARA program could be successfully 
extended to the small group market.  There is some concern around the de-population of the small 
group market and providing some relief could be an appropriate goal for the program.  That said, 
providing reinsurance to this additional population would place additional demands on MGARA’s 
funding.  Such an analysis is beyond the scope of the current analysis. 
 
4. This Memorandum assumes a $4 PMPM assessment level.  Please be aware that a fixed 
assessment level will have increasingly less market impact over time as medical costs continue to trend 
upward.  The indicated assessment level was established in 2012, and will have inherently less market 
impact in 2018 than it did originally.  In order to maintain a consistent level of market impact, the 
assessment level should be adjusted to reflect cost increases.  The amount of the Pass Through 
Payments is directly related to the amount of the Assessments made against the Maine insurance 
marketplace.   The larger the assessment amount, the larger the Pass Through Payments could be.    
 
5. The foregoing analysis is based upon various assumptions stated therein. The health 
insurance and ACA environment is highly dynamic and the validity and accuracy of our assumptions 
will depend in large part on future events over which we have little or no control. Consequently, we 
cannot assure that MGARA’s operating results will correspond to this analysis. To the exten t the 
assumptions upon which the projections are based are incorrect or inaccurate, the anticipated benefits 
derived from any MGARA program might be adversely affected and the variations could be material. 
 
Hopefully, you will find the foregoing helpful in reacting to the changes that are afoot in 
Washington, and guiding Maine’s response. Whether any of the analysis provided above will be relevant 
in addressing those changes is unclear; however, the Board wants to be sure you have its most current 
thinking in this rapidly changing environment. As discussed at the conclusion of our telephone call, the 
MGARA Board stands ready to provide whatever assistance it can as this process unfolds. 
 
       Very truly yours 
       
Christopher E. Howard 
